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Abstract 
 
 
This contribution investigates why firms keep on downsizing once they have started to do so. From a 
theoretical standpoint, we develop economic and institutional explanations for explaining corporate 
downsizing duration. The empirical work is carried out applying event history techniques to a sample of 
manufacturing firms drawn from the Spanish Survey on Business Strategies from 1994 to 2005. Although 
results show support for persistence in downsizing over time, repeated personnel reductions is not a 
widespread tool in managing the workforce in this country.  In addition, we find certain key corporate 
parameters such as profitability, temporality rate, size and employment termination costs (as well as 
market demand trends) to be important determinants of the continuation of on-going downsizing 
experiences. This is the first study on this issue using corporate-level data for Spain and multivariate 
methods. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The search for competitive advantage has led organizations to become more efficient 
and flexible in their use of human resources. Over the past two decades, a common 
organizational response has been to reduce workforce numbers through downsizing 
(Iverson and Pullman, 2003). Its prevalence in management literature since the 1980s is 
due to the fact that many organizations use downsizing as a tool to cut costs, and/or to 
improve profitability and productivity. Particularly in the United States, since the 1980s 
repeated waves of highly publicized large scale layoffs have occurred: in the mid-
nineties, fully 100 percent of Fortune 500 companies reported plans to downsize in the 
next five years (Diamond et al., 1996). Surprisingly, in spite of the fact that the evidence 
so far available suggests that the much sought-after cost reductions and increased 
efficiencies have not materialized (Cameron, 1998; Ebadan and Winstanley, 1997; 
Mentzer, 1996), corporate and public sector managers in this country have shown a 
strong propensity to embrace downsizing: companies which have been employing this 
cost-cutting method are still cutting back years later (DeMeuse, Vanderheiden and 
Bergmann, 1994; Diamond et al., 1996). That is, research has found multiple 
downsizing efforts by the same firm to be rather widespread. For instance, DeMeuse, 
Vanderheiden and Bergmann (1994) found that 62 percent of the companies in their 
sample that downsized in 1989 likewise downsized in 1990; furthermore, 85 percent of 
the companies that downsized in 1989 downsized again in 1991.  
Downsizing has also been extensively used by companies in economies characterized 
by stable employment practices in the last few years —such as some European countries 
(Filatotche, Buck and Zuckov, 2000) and Japan (Lee, 1997). In contrast with these 
economies, there remains no doubt that employers in the United States have pushed for 
and taken advantage of the greater facility to lay off workers (in terms of both a lack of 
legal and regulatory constraints and social norms) when business reasons make it 
expensive to retain them. As opposed to the U.S., in most European economies it seems 
harder to initiate and continue with such downsizing practices. In particular, Spain is 
often regarded as a country characterized by a high protection of employees’ rights —
due to tough job security rules, a generous unemployment insurance system and high 
firing costs (Jimeno, 1998). Given these institutional features and the fact that continued 
experiences of downsizing can have an unsustainable impact on both companies and the 
community —repeated downsizing may lead to a workforce that no longer has any great 
faith in its employers, which in turn is expressed in a less-than-desirable performance 
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(Mariappanadar, 2003)— it is interesting to investigate what keeps companies 
downsizing over time once they start doing so.  
This is precisely the objective of the present contribution: to amplify our knowledge on 
the determinants of downsizing duration for the Spanish case.  Our focus is on 
understanding why firms keep on downsizing once they have started to do so. We, 
therefore, depart from previous literature —which has focused on the determinants of a 
firm’s decision to downsize or the extent of downsizing (e.g., Vicente-Lorente and 
Suárez-González, 2007; Requejo, 1996)— by centering, instead, on the temporal nature 
of downsizing. This requires both a longitudinal dataset —instead of cross-sectional 
data which, despite being easy to collect and widely available, do not suffice to measure 
duration in downsizing— and an appropriate statistical method: event history analysis. 
This technique allows us to ask two kinds of questions regarding downsizing. The first 
question is useful to characterize the pattern of downsizing duration over time: does the 
length of time a firm has downsized influence its likelihood of continuing downsizing 
for longer? The second question asks us to examine the association between predictors 
of downsizing and its duration: which firm and market characteristics are associated 
with on-going downsizing efforts? For this purpose, we use survey data for Spanish 
manufacturing firms, for the period 1994-2005, drawn from the Survey on Business 
Strategies —Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales; ESEE, hereafter. The dataset 
used comprises relevant corporate characteristics which might be driving the 
continuation of firms in personnel reduction strategies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on generation of 
hypotheses. In section 3, we present the data and variables. The econometric model is 
presented in section 4, and estimation results in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
HYPOTHESES: EXPLAINING DOWNSIZING DURATION 
For the purposes of this study, we follow the lead of Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton 
(1988) who used the term “workforce reductions” to address “downsizing”. Since 
downsizing (when broadly defined) may incorporate the use of one or more resource 
reduction options (in conjunctions with personnel reductions), the term workforce 
reduction better distinguishes it from these other restructuring methods (DeWitt 1993, 
1998; Hoskisson and Hitts 1994). More specifically, our definition of downsizing refers 
to reductions in the size of workforce under open-ended contracts (or permanent 
employment). The concept excludes reductions in the size of the temporary workforce, 
which do not normally imply the notion of actual downsizing. Therefore, we considered 
that a firm downsized during a given year if the number of employees under open-ended 
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contracts decreased from the previous year to the current year. Since our dataset collects 
the size of permanent work force at the end of each year (see Section 3), it is 
straightforward to operationalize the latter’s percent variability from year t-1 to year t
1
. 
In this section, we analyze the factors that may help explain the longevity of firms in 
organizational downsizing. We claim that, once the firm has decided to reduce 
personnel, its duration in downsizing is shaped by its experience in downsizing, 
institutional forces and by firm characteristics. 
Organizational experience in downsizing 
Socio-cognitive and institutional forces. Following, McKinley, Sáncehz and Schick 
(1995) —who proposed that institutional theory can help explain why downsizing 
spread “like wildfire through the ranks of America’s largest corporations” (1995: 34)— 
there would exist a dynamic that leads companies to undertake downsizing simply 
because others in their community are doing it. They observe that constraining forces 
were at work pressuring organizations to downsize as a mode of conforming to 
institutional rules — “the right walk to walk, the right talk to talk, the right look to 
look” (1995:34). Closely related to constraining forces are cloning forces, which 
“pressure organizations to mimic the actions of the most prestigious, visible members of 
their industry” (1995:34). As a result, through these social and cognitive processes, 
downsizing is taken for granted more and more and diffuses even in the absence of 
compelling evidence for its financial efficiency (O’Neill, Pouder and Buchholtz,1998). 
According to Cameron (1994a: 183): “most companies agree that their downsizing 
efforts are guided more by anecdotal data from colleagues who have downsized 
previously, by past experience garnered from having downsized multiple times, or by 
mere ‘gut feel’ for what is right than by a set of guidelines or principles that have been 
validated or legitimated”. In this same vein, McKinley, Zhao and Rust (2000) proposed 
an “institutional perspective” of organizational downsizing to explain the popular 
adoption of downsizing among corporations in the 1990s. They contended that 
downsizing takes on the status of an institutionalized norm and provides legitimacy to 
those companies implementing it: one downsizing announcement may motivate 
stakeholders to initiate (correctly or incorrectly) a subsequent round of layoffs and — 
                                                           
1
 This definition conveys the usual idea of intentionality found in the downsizing literature, since (i) it 
excludes temporary employees (which is the convention) and (ii) includes layoffs, redundancies and early 
retirements (see Appendix A for a review on the procedures for employee reductions by employers in 
Spain). Thus, if despite implementing layoffs of permanent workers in a particular year the company ends 
up with an increase in the size of the permanent workforce (due to hiring new permanent workers), this 
situation is not considered as downsizing, according to our definition. Defining downsizing as the (net) 
reduction in the permanent work force is coincident with that used, among others, by Tang et al. (1995), 
Appelbaum et al. (1987), Lewis et al. (1996) or American Management Association (1998).  
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depending on changing economic conditions, stakeholder pressures or the lead of other 
firms in the same industry— managers may believe that additional rounds of layoffs 
may be necessary. That is, downsizing decisions would not be based on performance 
concerns, but on the need to achieve or maintain social legitimacy
2
.  
Organizational learning. Learning how to downsize effectively is important not only 
for companies experiencing difficulties, but also as a proactive strategy for healthy 
organizations (Bruton, Keels and Shook, 1996; Cameron, Freeman and Mishra, 1991; 
Greengard, 1993; Hitt et al., 1994).  Embarking on downsizing without learning how to 
do it well leads to several kinds of problems. The loss of vital organizational memory is 
one of the negative and expensive effects firms have suffered in downsizing. If 
managers do not think and plan ahead, their companies risk losing key skills and 
experiences as well as valuable knowledge when employees are moved out of their 
working units or leave the organization entirely (Hitt et al., 1994:25)
3
. 
A further typical negative effect of downsizing reported in the research that is relevant 
for organizational learning is that “it can foster an organization so preoccupied with 
bean counting, so anxious about where the ax will fall next, that employees become 
narrow minded, self-absorbed, and risk averse” (Henkoff, 1990:26). The ability of 
employees to continue to work well is likely to be severely curtailed in such stressful 
situations (Heckscher, 1995; Hitt et al., 1994:24), and they tend to be even less able to 
innovate and learn (Brockner, 1988; Dougherty and Bowman, 1995).  
Probably, the most significant conclusion drawn by studies of experiences in U.S. 
corporations is that downsizing must be regarded as something firms have to actively 
learn how to do well. Instead of conceiving downsizing to be “a one-time, quick-fix 
solution” (Cascio, 1993:103), a comprehensive framework is required, a whole process 
of grappling with the underlying problems and developing a range of activities to both 
restructure the organization and enable employees to make the transition to different 
jobs within or outside the organization (Applebaum, 1991; Bruton, Keels and Shook, 
1996; Cameron, Freeman and Mishra, 1991).  
Therefore, in managing downsizing, companies must firstly conduct a solid analysis of 
the situation and build a shared need to change before engaging in cutbacks of any kind 
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 Some tentative empirical evidence of institutional forces playing a role in the dispersion of downsizing 
is given by Budros (1999, 2000) and Love (2000). 
3
 The American Management Association, which has conducted a series of large scale studies on 
downsizing, found that most companies fell short of the objectives they had originally established, and 
that nearly half of the firms were “badly” or “not well” prepared for the process (reported in Cascio, 
1993:97-99; see also De Meuse et al., 1994). 
 
 6 
(Applebaum 1991). Involving employees in analyzing the situation and developing 
posible responses has been reported in the literature as an effective approach (Cameron, 
Freeman and Mishra, 1991; Feldman, 1993): this increases their awareness of the need 
to change and their willingness to participate in the process.  
 In a second step, companies must find it worthwhile to maximize alternatives to 
downsizing, in order both to maintain within the organization the experience and skills 
that have been built up over time and to act in a socially responsible manner towards 
employees (Cameron 1994b). Among the relevant practices described in the literature 
on downsizing are a) redeploying employees to other parts of the company, b) adjusting 
working time models to redistribute work differently rather than to simply “reduce 
headcount” (Bode, 1994); c) combining the gradual entry of young people with the 
gradual exit of older workers to ensure that new skills are brought on board and 
experience-based knowledge is passed on to the next generation. Parallel to looking for 
alternatives to downsizing are activities to cut costs, such as d) eliminating non-essential 
work processes, not just people (Greengard, 1993; Henkoff, 1990; Tomasko, 1992); and 
e) ensuring that status symbols, perks and bonuses for senior management are in line 
with downsizing goals so that management’s commitment to cost-cutting is credible and 
not seen to be purely at the expense of other employees (Hammonds, Zellner and 
Melcher, 1996; O’Neill and Lenn, 1995). Possibly, the most significant alternative to 
downsizing is f) looking for new markets for products and services to enable growth 
rather than focusing only on cutbacks (European Round Table, 1997).  
In a third step, to the extent that layoffs must be implemented in the downsizing 
process, the former must be managed appropriately, since there are a number of 
practices to choose from. For instance, layoffs can be made across the board or 
selectively; in order to avoid being left “shorthanded and shortskilled” (Hitt et al. 
1994:25), companies have learned that a better strategy may be a selective approach 
oriented to the key competencies needed in the organization. Whichever approach is 
taken, the communication of clear criteria contributes to a sense of fairness in layoff 
decisions (Greengard,1993), and companies have found it useful to train managers to 
communicate layoff decisions sensitively and effectively (Kets de Vries and Balasz, 
1996).  
The final steps in this process of organizational learning are to manage the employees 
remaining in the organization and implement changes in the organization itself (Heenan, 
1991). The literature reports that a frequent mistake is to overlook the effects on 
“survivors” of the downsizing process, particularly of layoffs (Rubach, 1995). These 
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employees have been found to experience fear of losing their job, guilt for still having it 
while former colleagues may be unemployed, anger at the organization that did this to 
them, and exhaustion from overload (Davenport, 1995; Smallwood and Jacobsen, 1987, 
Caplan and Teese, 1997). 
In sum, firms who fail to manage this learning process appropriately are less likely to 
make poor or incorrect decisions that lead to future downsizing either as a result of 
letting the wrong people go or failing to make significant enough cuts to have an effect.    
Thus, one would expect a positive relationship between the accumulation of knowledge 
—reflecting the organizational learning process in downsizing— and the duration of 
downsizing
4
. In addition, according to the institutional and socio-cognitive forces 
discussed above, if companies see downsizing as something they have to get through by 
cobbling together a set of activities as they go, they are not likely to put in place the best 
available measures and use them effectively. Short-termism will then affect the decision 
to go on downsizing and, as a result, the probability that downsizing will end falls the 
longer it goes on. For these reasons, experience in downsizing is taken into account with 
the inclusion of dummy variables (one for each year denoting duration in downsizing; 
see section 4 for further details on the way these variables are defined). 
Thus, from the previous arguments, we predict: 
Hypothesis 1: The longer the duration of downsizing, the more likely is downsizing to 
be continued. 
Institutional labour market context: Country-specific labour separation costs 
In many countries, dismissals of workers under open-ended contracts are subject to 
relatively high adjustment costs. These adjustment costs include fixed employment 
costs (e.g., administration costs for hiring and layoff), investments in firm specific 
human capital, long-term work incentives (e.g., seniority wages), and separation costs 
due to institutional employment protection (e.g., severance pay, law suits) —see Abowd 
and Kramarz (2003). Among the latter, in Spain firms’ costs of changing their 
permanent workforce size are determined by legislation that protects workers against 
individual dismissals and by specific requirements for collective redundancies (Toharia 
and Malo, 2000). The main difference between temporary and open-ended contracts is 
that the latter provide the right to sue the employer for unfair dismissals when the labor 
relationship is terminated by the employer: a dismissal can be very expensive for the 
employer in comparison to other countries (Appendix A reviews the procedures for 
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 This does not imply that companies desire to remain in a downsizing mode, since this practice may have 
enough negative consequences for all concerned (even top managers). 
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employee reductions by employers in Spain). Thus, regulation on individual and 
collective dismissals —as well as the retribution offered by the firm to workers in cases 
of early retirement— increases the costs enterprises incur when terminating contracts, 
either directly via payments or indirectly via procedural costs (e.g. notice periods or 
court trials). Such payments reduce the gain to a firm from dismissing a worker, and 
hence would be predicted to decrease the rate of worker dismissal. Moreover, not only 
by increasing the costs of employment adjustments are employment termination costs 
expected to slow the adjustment of employment to changes in output. Contract 
provisions may also require advance notice of layoffs, transfer opportunities, or 
outplacement assistance. Advance notice of layoffs often leads to discussions between 
union and management that generate proposals for avoiding layoffs, such as economic 
concessions for job security (Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton, 1988). If this is the 
case, by foreseeing these discussions, management may be reluctant to go on with work 
force reductions (or may decide to postpone downsizing until the economic situation of 
the company is so compelling that severe downsizing is implemented to best accomplish 
shrinkage).  
On the whole, given that institutional labor market factors are expected to play a key 
role as regards downsizing duration
5
, we use a proxy for the extent to which the 
company is incurring in costly adjustments of employment: the ratio of severance, early 
retirement and voluntary severance pay over total labor costs. Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms incurring larger costs in adjusting employment are less likely to 
continue downsizing. 
Firm characteristics 
Firm’s temporality rate: The importance of employment flexibility has been discussed 
in many economic and management studies (Abraham, 1988; Brodsky, 1994; Carlsson, 
1989; Houseman, 2001; Hunter et al., 1993). Firms have several options to react to 
demand-induced output fluctuations (Pfeifer, 2005). One consists of varying the number 
of temporary employees to adjust employment to firm’s profit maximizing level. 
Typically, the peripheral workforce consists of contingent workers with fixed-term 
                                                           
5
 A series of reforms attempted to remove existing rigidities in the Spanish labour market from the 
eighties, so that the responsiveness of employment to changes in output might have risen following these 
reforms. In 1984, the use of fixed-term contracts was encouraged, which carried few of the costs 
associated with permanent employment. In 1994, a second batch of reforms was introduced aimed at 
gaining flexibility into the management of labor resources —to this end, apprenticeship, part-time and 
temporary replacement work contracts were introduced, and collective redundancies deemed justifiable 
on technological, economic and certain other grounds were made easier (Corkhill and Harrison 2004).. 
Likewise, in 1997, permanent contracts were introduced with lower severance payments and firms were 
 9 
contracts, who have low levels of firm specific human capital and weak employment 
protection (OECD, 2002: 127-185; OECD, 2004: 61-125). Severance payments are low 
or even non-existent for temporary contracts. Thus, temporary work arrangements offer 
potential ways to avoid adjustment costs and as such they may help accelerate the 
adjustment of the workforce to economic shocks (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992; Foote 
and Folta, 2002; Hagen, 2003). This is particularly acute in Spain, where since 1992 
temporary employment has accounted for about one third of total employment—it is the 
highest rate in the European Union (in Europe the average proportion is around 13%)— 
and it has reached a kind of “steady state” from then on: independently of policies and 
of the business cycle, it has remained more or less stable. 
According to dual labor market theory, employees with temporary contracts can be 
interpreted as a firm’s peripheral workforce, whereas non-temporary employment 
relationships are a typical characteristic of the core workforce (Atkinson, 1987; Cappelli 
and Neumark, 2004; Kalleberg, 2001). The core-periphery hypothesis implies that non-
temporary employees gain a higher degree of job security due to the use of a flexible 
workforce, since temporary employment is used as a “buffer”, which is adjusted to 
demand fluctuations (Booth et al., 2002). Employers are able to treat temporary and 
regular, full-time employees differently in many ways, such as the extent to which they 
are promised continued employment, what they are expected to contribute to the 
organization and other understandings related to the employment contract. Permanent 
workers exploit their lower likelihood of becoming unemployed on the grounds that a 
‘high’ wage claim hardly affects their probability of survival since the eventually laid-
off worker is a temporary one given the lower dismissal costs associated to temporary 
work contracts. In short, the bargaining position of the insiders may be strengthened 
since dismissals provoked by excessive wage settlements may affect temporary workers 
first  (Jimeno et. al., 1993, Bentolila et. al., 1994).  
From the above considerations, it follows that firms may use fixed-term contracts to 
adjust to demand fluctuations and decrease the turnover of permanent workers 
simultaneously. This way, firms would be taking advantage of the lower dismissal costs 
associated with the discharge of temporary workers when no longer needed. The firm 
temporality rate is computed by dividing the number of workers with temporary 
workers over the total number of employees.  
Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
allowed to dismiss workers on permanent contracts on the grounds of falling consumer demand and the 
need to regain competitiveness.   
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Hypothesis 3: Firms with a larger proportion of temporary workers are less likely to 
continue downsizing. 
Firm size: Firm size is related to several organizational attributes. One such parameter 
is the amount of discretionary resources (i.e., slack) that firms have available 
(Dougherty, 1979). Organizational size reflects the discretionary resources available to 
(among other things) attract or provide for members of the organization. One purpose 
for which discretionary resources can be employed is to fund disengagement incentives, 
which are incentives provided to employees to entice them to voluntarily leave the 
organization (such as early retirement programs or voluntary severance packages; see 
Nixon et al., 2004). Larger firms, with more absolute resources, may not feel as much 
impact on corporate performance of employing disengagement incentives compared to 
the impact on the performance of smaller firms. Additional links between firm size and 
the duration of downsizing occurs for two reasons: (i) the economic argument associates 
large size with operating inefficiencies: larger firms are more likely to be less efficient 
and to have more slack personnel (Budros, 1999). Therefore, the need for continuing 
downsizing might be more compelling: this way, managers might enhance financial 
performance by preventing their firm from employing too many people and from 
operating with over-bureaucratic (or ill-conceived) structures. And (ii) the institutional 
argument is that highly visible large firms downsize for longer in order to be viewed 
favourably by stakeholders as users of the latest corporate practice (Edelman, 1990; 
Powell, 1991) —see, in this respect, the arguments from section 2.1 above. The number 
of employees is included to control firm size through a set of dummy variables denoting 
≤ 50, > 50 & ≤ 100, >100 & ≤200, >200 & ≤ 500, and >500 employees. 
Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 4: The largest the size of the firm, the more likely the firm is to continue 
downsizing. 
Profitability. Unsatisfactory performance or significant profit declines are corroborated 
as explanatory factors of downsizing (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997; Rust, 1999; 
Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Budros, 2002). When the firm implements downsizing 
once low levels profitability have been achieved, the downsizing could be viewed as a 
reactive measure in order to improve conditions in the future. Lengthening downsizing 
under these conditions may improve the short-term prospects of the firm. When the 
decision to implement downsizing is followed by high company performance results, 
downsizing under these circumstances may be interpreted as a proactive strategy that 
would create higher cash flows available to shareholders —lower input costs and, 
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hence, higher profit margins may be achieved (for instance, technological advances or 
more efficient production methods will allow the firm to operate with fewer 
employees). However, these proactive downsizing decisions are expected to be less 
frequent than the reactive ones (those taken as a consequence of negative firm 
performance). Thus, we claim firm performance and downsizing duration to be 
negatively associated, after controlling for the remainder of predictors —among them, 
stakeholder pressures to implement proactive downsizing are already taken into 
consideration through the inclusion of the firm size variable (as explained above). 
Profitability is taken into account by two measures of financial accounting outcomes: 
return on assets (operating income/total assets) and return on sales (operating 
income/total sales). Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 5: The largest corporate profitability is, the less likely the firm is to 
continue downsizing. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data 
The present study utilizes a large sample of yearly spell data from the Spanish Survey of 
Business Strategies (ESEE) for the years 1994 to 2005. This is an annual survey of 
Spanish manufacturing firms sponsored by the Ministry of Industry and carried out 
since 1990. Certain features of the ESEE make it suitable for our analysis. Firstly, the 
ESEE covers a wide range of Spanish manufacturing firms operating in all industries. 
The sample is representative of Spanish manufacturing firms with between 10 and 200 
employees; it is probabilistic, and stratified by industry and firm size (in terms of the 
number of employees). Secondly, the ESEE provides relevant corporate parameters that 
might be driving the continuation of firms in downsizing. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, as of 1993, several questions regarding changes in workforce size were 
included in the survey. Some of the firms in the sample reduced permanent workers 
during the first year they featured in the sample, so we do not know whether this was 
the year they began their spell of downsizing or whether they began some years earlier. 
Should we include these data in the analysis, we would incur in a problem of left-
censoring that would lead to underestimation of the length of such spells. In order to 
avoid this problem, we only consider the downsizing spell if the exact year it began is 
known. Therefore, as we do not consider spells already under way in 1993, the first 
downsizing spells in our sample kick off in 1994. The selected firms are then followed 
until the year 2005 (which is the last year for which our dataset includes variables 
collecting changes in workforce size). Every firm which goes on reducing its permanent 
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workforce size after 6 years is considered a censored observation (given the scarcity of 
observations beyond this duration), as well as firms observed in the last downsizing year 
in the database (due to the fact that their ensuing downsizing status remains 
unobserved). After cleaning the data, we ended up with a sample of 1,188 companies 
(1,985 company-year observations). 
Sample statistics: The distribution of downsizing duration  
In order to find out how long firms go before stopping permanent workforce reductions, 
we will make use of event history data for discrete-time processes. The fundamental 
tool for summarizing the sample distribution of event occurrences is the life table (see 
Table 1). As befits its name, a life table tracks the event histories (the “lives”) of our 
sample of companies from the beginning of time (when no company has yet 
experienced the target event) through the end of data collection (year 2005). In our case, 
we track the downsizing duration of 1,188 companies. Defining the “beginning of time” 
as the data where the company begins downsizing, our research interest centers on 
whether and, if so, when these companies stop downsizing.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
In Table 1, we have labeled the time intervals using ordinal numbers. Companies are 
observed at time 0. No event can occur during the 0
th
 interval, which begins at time 0 
and ends just before year 1, the first observable event time (conceptually, this interval 
represents the “beginning of time”). Each subsequent interval —labeled 1 through 6— 
refers to a specific year. Divided into a series of rows extending time intervals, Table 1 
includes information on the number of companies which: entered the interval (column 
3; i.e., the number of companies where downsizing occurs at the beginning of each 
year
6
); experienced the target event during the interval (column 4; i.e., the number who 
stopped downsizing during the year); were censored at the end of the interval (column 
5; i.e., were still downsizing when data collection ended). Taken together all these 
columns provide a narrative history of event occurrence over time. At the “beginning of 
time” every company was downsizing. During the first year, 475 companies quit by the 
end of that year and 260 were censored. This left only 453 companies (1188-475-260) 
to enter the second year and of these, 186 quit by the end of that year and 85 were 
censored. During the sixth year, of the 24 companies who downsized continuously for 6 
                                                           
6
 We use the term risk set to refer to the number of companies who enter each successive time period: 
those eligible to experience the event during that interval. 
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years, 7 quit by the end of that year and 17 were censored. This life table describes the 
event histories for 1,985 “company-years”: 1,188 year 1’s, 453 year 2’s, up through 24 
for year 6’s. 
Additionally, column 6 in Table 1 shows the proportion of companies downsizing at the 
beginning of each year which stopped doing so at the end of the year. That is, it shows 
the conditional probability that company i will stop downsizing in time period j given 
that it did not experience it in any earlier time period (i.e, the hazard; see Section 4 for a 
more formal explanation on the hazard rate). Among the 1,188 companies, 0.3998 
(n=475) left by the end of their first year. Of the 453 which kept downsizing for more 
than one year, 0.4106 (n=186) stopped downsizing by the end of their second. These 
proportions are the discrete limit of the well-known Kaplan-Meier estimates of the 
hazard for continuous-time data (Efron, 1988).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
The magnitude of the hazard in each time interval indicates the risk of event occurrence 
in that interval: the greater the hazard, the greater the risk. Figure 1 shows both the 
sample hazard and the predicted hazard (see Table 3 below). As can be observed, in the 
first two years of downsizing, the sample hazard is around 0.40. This indicates that over 
40% of the companies still downsizing at the beginning of each of these years stops 
downsizing by the end of the year. After these initial “hazardous” years, the risk of 
stopping declines (by year 3, the hazard never exceeds 0.30) and then increases during 
the last two years. Therefore, the estimated hazard function peaks in the first few years 
and declines thereafter: it is a non-monotonic hazard function (it is U-shaped from the 
second year on). Thus, companies are more likely to stop downsizing at two points: 
immediately after their initial implementation and then after having used downsizing for 
a long period of time (five or six years). In the middle period —between the second and 
the fourth years— the effects of experience reign, with relatively few continuing 
companies stopping workforce reduction. Therefore, novice downsizers, or those with 
only a few years of experience are at greatest risk of stopping downsizing (it is as if 
companies sought to exit the status of downsizing as quickly as possible). However, 
once they gain experience, the risk of stopping downsizing substantially declines and 
slightly increases for long periods of time. 
Finally, Table 1 shows the survivor function. This function, unlike the hazard function 
(which assesses the unique risk associated with each time period) cumulates these 
period-by-period risks of event occurrence (or more properly, non-occurrence) together 
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to assess the probability that a randomly selected company will “survive” (i.e., will not 
experience the event)
7
. The estimated survival probability for year j is simply the 
estimated survival probability for the previous year multiplied by one minus the 
estimated hazard probability for that year. For instance, we estimate that 0.354 of all 
companies survive through the second year. Because the estimated hazard probability 
for year 3 is 0.2967, we estimate that 0.7033 of those in the third-year risk set will not 
stop downsizing that year. An estimate of the survival probability at the end of the third 
year is thus (0.354)*(0.703)=0.249. Having characterized the distribution of our event 
time of interest (i.e., stopping downsizing) using the hazard and survivor functions, we 
can use an estimate of the distribution center: the estimated median lifetime
8
. It is the 
point in time by which we estimated that half of the sample has stopped downsizing, 
half has not. Thus, it answers the question “How long does the average company 
downsize?” According to Table 1, we know that the estimated median lifetime falls 
somewhere between year 1 and year 2. For this purpose, following Miller (1981), we 
linearly interpolate between the two values of the survivor function that bracket 0.5, and 
obtain an estimated median lifetime of 1.4 years
9
.  
Dependent variable 
We record the dependent variable as a series of binary outcomes denoting whether or 
not the event of interest occurred at the observation point (i.e., stopping downsizing).  
As explained above, each discrete time unit for each firm is treated as a separate 
observation or unit of analysis. For each of these observations, the dependent variable is 
coded as 1 if the event occurred to that firm in that time unit; otherwise, it is coded zero. 
Thus, if a firm experienced the event at time 5, five different observations would be 
created. For the fifth observation, the dependent variable would be coded one. To 
illustrate the form of the dependent variable used, consider the downsizing data given in 
Table 2. The first column of data gives an identification number for each firm. The 
second column of data is comprised of a sequence of zeroes and ones. A zero denotes 
that in that year, the firm continues reducing the size of its permanent workforce —i.e., 
the event does not occur. A one denotes stopping downsizing —i.e., the event occurs. 
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 At the beginning of time, when no one has experienced the event, every company is surviving, and so by 
definition, its value is 1 
8
 If there were no censoring, all event times would be known, and we could compute a sample mean. But 
because of censoring, this estimate of central tendency (the median lifetime) is preferred. 
9
 Formally, let m represent the time interval when the sample survivor function is just above 0.5 (here, 
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Consider case 1. We see that this firm “enters” the process in 1994 and progresses 
through 6 years until in 1999 the firm stops downsizing: the event occurs. Firm 2 begins 
downsizing in year 1997 but stops at the second year (1998). Thus, although our 
dependent variable is a sequence of zeroes and ones, the information conveyed by this 
sequence is equivalent to that conveyed by the actual duration time
10
. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Control variables 
A number of economic controls were added following previous research on downsizing 
(descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are shown in Appendix 
B). 
Employee productivity. Managers usually undertake cutback measures to improve 
efficiency when labor productivity drops in order to restore the undermined company 
competitive position (Budros, 1997) and/or to adjust for its oversized staff (Greenhalgh, 
Lawrence and Sutton, 1988). Employee productivity is measured through the value 
added per employee ratio, which allows us to examine the impact of organizational 
performance on downsizing duration, apart  from financial performance. Moreover, 
given that downsizing is frequently encouraged by managers with the purpose of 
decreasing labor costs —and, therefore, increases in labor costs (wage, salaries and 
social security contributions) may induce continuation of downsizing— we use the log 
transformation of the ratio of labor costs over sales in order to control the potential 
impact of labor costs on workforce reductions.  
Market demand. Demand changes are additionally viewed from an economic 
perspective as a basic determinant of labor contracting (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994) as 
well as an environmental factor of organization size and growth (Harrigan, 1980). 
Evidence for US firms supports a robust relationship between downsizing strategies and 
sales cutbacks (Budros, 1997; DeWitt, 1998). We measured the trend of demand 
through a set of dummy variables collecting whether the market addressed by the 
company has enlarged, remained constant or decreased, as well as through a dummy 
variable which collects whether the market addressed by the firm is in recession.  
Additionally, we also include the log transformation of the firm’s average use of 
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 This way of arranging the data allows us collect the cases where a company downsizes for one or two 
years, then stops for a year or two and then resumed the practice. 
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capacity utilization —in times of weak capacity utilization, employers will be eager to 
continue firing workers (Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton, 1988) 
The extent of permanent workforce reduction. As the proportion of workforce 
reduction is larger, the firm may naturally have less need to continue downsizing in 
subsequent years because large downsizings may have especially severe effects: a major 
loss of human capital is likely to disrupt a firm’s bundles of resources and thereby 
downgrade its set of capabilities required to create and sustain a competitive advantage 
(Nixon et al., 2004).  We therefore compute the percent variability in the permanent 
workforce from year t-1 to year t.  
Liquidity and leverage. When a firm is experiencing lower operating income, and this 
situation persists, management may be forced to undertake more drastic measures to 
mitigate the problem: laying off employees may be the only answer as a reaction to 
financial distress (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Pearce and Robbins 1993, 1994; 
Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Schendel and Patton, 1976). By lowering labor expenses, a 
firm may be better able to meet its immediate financial obligations. Moreover, if the 
firm has to service a large amount of debt, it will be more difficult to pay creditors. As a 
result, continuing downsizing will be less desirable, due to the costs associated with the 
reduction in the levels of permanent workers. On the contrary, lower leverage implies 
that it is easier to pay creditors, so that it becomes less necessary to reduce the 
permanent work force size so as to release internal resources for paying creditors or 
convincing them to concede the firm a deferment in payments (Requejo, 1996). We 
therefore take the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio as an indication of its leverage.  In addition, 
we include the current ratio —i.e., the ratio of current assets to current liabilities— as an 
indication of a firm's market liquidity. 
Firm’s age. Eldest organizations might be more subject to organizational inertia and 
resistance to change, due to their bureaucratization as time goes by (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). Thus, according to this view, such firms will be more reluctant to go 
on downsizing. Moreover, as time goes by, lack of coherence between firm’s 
environment and its organizational structure is more likely, so that a need for continuing 
with downsizing practices may be more compelling. In addition, the firm’s life cycle is 
an important factor behind restructuring decisions (Coucke, Peenings and Sleuwagen, 
2007). Older firms facing more competitive pressure and operating in mature markets 
have to focus on cost reduction: thus, they may find it more profitable to go on 
downsizing.  Age is included through a set of four dummy variables collecting the 
firm’s foundation year: <1960, ≥1960 & ≤1975, >1975 & ≤1985 and >1985. 
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Type of ownership. In order to account for the effects of different types of ownership, 
we distinguish five categories: Individual owner, Public Limited Company, Limited 
Company, Cooperative and Other. In addition, since the selection of managerial 
personnel policies is influenced by whether an organization is in the public or private 
sector (Dobbin et al. 1998), we control whether a firm’s capital is owned by a public 
institution in a substantial proportion by including a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 if public ownership is above 50 percent of total capital (and 0 otherwise).  
Analogously, as the origin of the corporate block holder investing in the firm may affect 
the behavior of the firm and its knowledge of downsizing strategies, we include a 
dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if foreign ownership is above 50 percent of 
total capital (and 0 otherwise). 
Industry and local economic cycle effects. Differences between trade union influences 
may exist among industries, which may shorten or lengthen the downsizing experiences. 
In addition, in highly-automated industries downsizing will be infrequently continued to 
improve firm performance as these industries typically have less human (as compared to 
equipment) contribution to the final products (Cherns, 1976; Susman and Chase, 1986; 
Trist, 1978) —on the contrary, in low-automation manufacturing industries, downsizing 
may have a greater impact on firm performance because there is more human 
contribution to the organization’s output (and will therefore be more necessary to 
maintain). Moreover, firms in various industries may be more inclined to downsize 
because the effects of economic factors may be greater on these firms. For these 
reasons, we control the industry by including dummies for twenty categories
11
. Finally, 
workforce reduction is typically countercyclical; i.e., it peaks during economic 
downturns and declines during periods of economic growth (Fallick, 1996: 1), with the 
reason being that in difficult economic times, a firm’s need to reduce expenses is larger 
(Nixon et al., 2004). Thus, we include as a covariate the unemployment rate in each 
Spanish region where firms are located. 
METHOD 
 
In this section, we model the probability that a firm will stop reducing personnel after 
some specific interval of time (conditional on continuing downsizing up to that point). 
Given the structure of the discrete-time data and the form of our dependent variable (see 
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 Meat Products, Tobacco and Food, Drinks, Textile Products, Leather and Shoes, Wood Products, Paper 
Products, Publishing and Graphic Arts, Chemical Products, Plastic materials and Rubber, Non-metallic 
minerals, Metallurgy, Metallic Products, Machinery & mechanical equipment, Office machinery & 
computing equipment, Electric machinery & equipment, Motor vehicles, Other transportation equipment, 
Furniture and Other manufacturing industries 
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Section 3.3), we will make use of an event history (i.e., a record of when this event 
occurred to the firms in our sample). The hazard probability conveniently conveys this 
notion of risk, as it reflects the probability of stopping downsizing, conditional on 
survival and covariates. In our case, the event can occur at any point in time, but the 
ESEE only collects whether the firms downsize in each year. Thus, we will apply the 
following discrete-time model. 
We assume that time can take on only positive integer values (t=1, 2, 3, …) and that we 
observe a total of n  independent firms (i=1, 2, …, n) beginning at some natural point 
t=1. The observation continues until time ti, at which point either downsizing is stopped 
or the observation is censored. Censoring means that the company is observed at ti but 
not at ti+1. It is assumed that the time of censoring is independent of the hazard rate for 
the occurrence of events. Also observed is a Kx1 vector of explanatory variables xit, 
which may take on different values at different discrete times. We begin by defining the 
discrete-time hazard rate: 
[ ]itiiit xtTtTP ,|Pr ≥==      (1) 
where T is the discrete random variable giving the uncensored time of event occurrence 
(i.e., stopping downsizing). Pit is the conditional probability that the event occurs at 
time t, given that it has not already occurred. 
The next step is to specify how this hazard rate depends on time and the explanatory 
variables. If one assumes that the data are generated by the continuous-time 
proportional hazards model
12
, it has been shown (Holford, 1976) that the corresponding 
discrete-time hazard function is given by: 
( )[ ]ittit xP βα ′+−−= expexp1     (2) 
where the coefficient vector β is a Kx1 vector of constants and represents the effects of 
the explanatory variables on the probability of the event.  Thus, if x1 has a positive 
coefficient β1, an increase in x1 produces an increase in the likelihood that the event will 
occur. By assumption, these effects are constant over time. Note that αt (t=1,2,…) is just 
a set of constants and collects the organizational experience in downsizing (hypothesis 
1). Here, we apply a very general way to account for duration in downsizing: the 
inclusion of temporal dummy variables —i.e., by specifying interval-specific (annual) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
12
 The functional form of the proportional hazards model in continuous form is: ( ) ( ) xtxt βαλ ′+=,log , 
where α(t) is an unspecified function of time, β is a Kx1 vector of constants, and λ(t,x) is the hazard rate, 
which can be defined as: ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tFtft −= 1/λ , where f(t) is the probability density for T, and F(t) is the 
cumulative distribution function for T. It is called the proportional hazards model because the ratio of the 
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dummies (αt), with one for each year at risk. Therefore, this implies a fully non-
parametric baseline hazard. Because the method does not specify a functional form for 
the baseline hazard, it is more robust than parameter approaches. Parametric models rely 
on fully specifying the base-line hazard. However, the chosen functional form may not 
be valid and it is particularly vulnerable to problems caused by unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms (Jones 2005). 
Equation (2) may be solved to yield the so-called complementary log-log function: 
 
( )[ ] ittit xP βα ′+=−1loglog      (3) 
  
The likelihood of the data may be written as follows: 
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where δi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the observation is uncensored and zero 
if censored. 
Each of the probabilities in (4) can be expressed as a function of the hazard rate. Using 
elementary properties of conditional probabilities, it can be shown that: 
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Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) and taking the logarithm yields the log-likelihood 
function: 
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At this point one can substitute the appropriate regression model for Pit (equation 3) and 
then proceed to maximize logL with respect to αt (t=1, 2, 3, …) and β. Allison (1984) 
and Jenkins (1995) show that —by defining the dummy variable yit equal to 1 if firm i 
stops downsizing at time t, otherwise zero— (7) can be rewritten as: 
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hazard rate for any two companies at any point in time is a constant over time. See Allison (1982) for 
further details. 
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which is the log likelihood for the regression analysis of dichotomous dependent 
variables (Cox, 1970; Hanushek and Jackson, 1977; Nerlove and Press, 1983). Thus, the 
discrete-time hazard model described above can be estimated using programs for the 
analysis of dichotomous data. 
Finally, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is particularly important. Recall, for 
instance, that according to constraining and cloning forces (Section 2.1), firms tend to 
copy-cat other firm’s downsizing practices. However, the ability to do this must 
necessarily be left out of the empirical model proposed because it is immeasurable
13
. 
This way, unobserved heterogeneity will be induced in the model as such covariate is 
not included in the model’s specification. This can lead to problematic inferences in so 
far as parameter estimates can be inconsistent. Consider the case where there are two 
types of firms: “frail” companies which have a high (but constant) hazard rate and 
“strong” companies which have a low (but constant) hazard rate. The two groups may 
be equally mixed in the population to begin with, but over time the frailer companies 
will tend to stop downsizing first, leading to an unequal mix. As time passes, the 
proportion of frail companies will decrease and the overall hazard will decrease. If it is 
not possible to control for the heterogeneity between the two types of firms, this will 
give the appearance of a decreasing hazard over time. We thus deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity by introducing into the hazard rate an additional random parameter that 
amounts for unobserved heterogeneity (Hougaard, 2000). This way, we treat 
unobserved heterogeneity non-parametrically, by assuming that the unobservable error 
term has a discrete distribution characterised by a set of mass points, where the value of 
these mass points and the probabilities attached to them are estimated as part of the 
maximum likelihood estimation (Heckman and Singer, 1984)
14
. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the discrete time hazard model presented 
previously. Model 1 differs from Model 2 in that the former includes the return on sales 
(ROS), while the latter makes use of the return on assets (ROA) as the measure for 
corporate performance. To check whether the number of mass points is robust as 
regards the specification with unobservables, three alternative information criteria were 
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 Moreover, the standard measure of mimicry (the percentage of firms in an industry that have 
downsized) cannot be added as an explanatory variable, since it precisely represents the hazard rate at 
each time interval (see Section 3.2). 
14
 Alternatively, unobserved heterogeneity can be dealt with by parametrically (i.e., by specifying a 
parametric distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity such as a normal, gamma distribution, etc.). 
However, this approach has been criticised by Heckman and Singer (1984), as the unobserved 
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applied: the Akaike information criterion, the Hannan-Quinn criterion and the Bayesian 
information criterion. All information criteria lead to the same conclusion: in any model 
specification where firm unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, including two 
mass points did not improve the model fit.
15
 Thus, as we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that unobserved heterogeneity is relevant, the estimated models do not 
include any mass points: our comments will be based on the models where unobserved 
heterogeneity is not taken into account.  
   --------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
The discrete-time hazard models include two types of parameters. On the one hand, 
those representing the baseline hazard function (i.e.: the time indicators: Year1, …, 
Year6) —see the previous section. On the other hand, the remainder of the parameters 
represent the hypothesized influence of each predictor on the hazard rate. The sign on 
each of these latter coefficients indicates the effect on the hazard rate out of downsizing. 
That is, a negative (positive) coefficient has a positive (negative) effect on the duration.  
 
The time indicators 
Note that unlike the familiar regression model, Models 1 and 2 contain no single stand-
alone intercept
16
. Instead, the parameters (Year1,… Year6) act like multiple intercepts 
—one per time period—, indicating the value of the outcome in each particular period. 
We can interpret these parameters as intercepts because of the way we have defined the 
time indicators. In the sixth year, for example, only Year6=1, so that all other terms 
(Year1,..,Year5) disappear, leaving the population value of the hazard in the 6
th
 year to 
be its estimated coefficient. Taken together, these parameters represent the estimated 
baseline hazard function. The amount and direction of variation in their values describe 
the shape of this function and tell us whether risk increases, decreases or remains steady 
over time. The estimated baseline hazard is non-significant in Model 1: therefore, in this 
model, the risk of stopping downsizing is unrelated to time. However, in Model 2, the 
estimated time indicators become significant for every year except for Year2 and Year6: 
the baseline hazard declines up to the fourth year, and then slightly increases. Thus, 
according to Model 2, the risk of stopping downsizing significantly decreases over time 
                                                                                                                                                                          
heterogeneity distribution is unknown. These authors show that parametric-form assumptions for 
unobserved heterogeneity might be biased when the chosen distribution is incorrect. 
15
 Results are available upon request. 
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up to the fourth year (which offers support for hypothesis 1). Figure 1 plots its values 
(calculated for sample means at all covariates, except for those capturing the time 
indicators). As can be observed, in year 2 the fitted hazard probability reaches its 
maximum (0.4817), and then falls to a minimum of 0.3513 in Year 4.  
The remainder of estimated coefficients 
The proportion of temporary workers is a statistically significant variable, as it 
significantly increases the hazard rate. Therefore, firms with a higher proportion of 
temporary workers are less likely to continue cutting the size of their permanent 
workforce. We may conclude, therefore, that fixed-term contracts raise the flexibility of 
firms: when the need arises to continue downsizing —which may be the case when the 
firm faces a severe downturn as opposed to a short-term fluctuation— varying the 
peripheral workforce can help to save costs and to accelerate employment adjustment. 
These results, thus, offer support for the core-periphery hypothesis (hypothesis 3). 
On the contrary, employment termination costs (as a proportion over total personnel 
costs) present a significant negative impact on the decision to continue reducing 
permanent work force size. These costs are associated with a lower propensity by firms 
to stop downsizing —this result does not support hypothesis 2. Thus, in spite of the 
institutional features of the Spanish labor market —which gives workers strong 
employment rights, and therefore, imposes important constraints upon employers’ 
downsizing behavior— job security regulation need not inhibit the decision of 
employers to continue downsizing, suggesting that the impact of dismissal related costs 
is relatively insubstantial. This result is in line with studies on the effects of firing costs 
on employment adjustment, which do not support the conclusion that firing costs slow 
firms’ decision to adjust employment levels (e.g., Abraham and Houseman, 1994; Hunt, 
2000). Rather, it is as if despite incurring employment termination costs, firms still 
needed to adjust their work force by getting rid of the least productive workers (Toharia 
and Malo, 2000). 
Finally, we find that large firms survive longer in downsizing than small firms. This 
occurs for firms with more than 50 employees. Indeed, the hazard rate is lower as firm 
size is larger. Thus, once downsizing has begun, larger firms have a larger propensity to 
continue with personnel reductions, which offers support for hypothesis 4. And both 
measures of profitability (ROS and ROA) exert a positive impact on the hazard rate out 
of downsizing, which offers support for hypothesis 5.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
16
 Some readers may be more familiar with a specification that includes a stand-alone intercept and 
excludes one of the time indicators. This alternative specification, although identical in fit to the 
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As regards control variables, the likelihood of stopping downsizing increases with the 
value added to employee ratio, although only in Model 2. On the contrary, when 
demand shortfalls are experienced due to an economic recession (which is likely to be 
affecting more or less all firms in the sample), continuation of downsizing is more 
compelling. Thus, experiencing performance difficulties due to market trends is a 
relevant explanatory factor of the length of on-going downsizing efforts. On the 
contrary, the regional unemployment rate presents a positive impact on the hazard rate. 
This may be explained by the fact that regions with a higher unemployment rate are 
characterized by a larger presence of temporary workers so that, instead of getting rid of 
permanent workers, an alternative might be simply getting rid of temporary workers. 
Finally, the estimated coefficients for age show that firms whose year of incorporation 
is between 1975 and 1985 face higher chances of failure (that is, of ending their 
downsizing spell). This result underscores the firm’s lifecycle as an important factor 
behind downsizing decisions (Coucke, Peenings and Sleuwagen,  2007): as eldest firms 
facing more competitive pressure and operating in mature markets have to focus on cost 
reduction, it may be more profitable for them to extend their downsizing practices over 
time.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed unprecedented levels of restructuring. In order to 
survive, companies had to cut costs by closing down operations, radically reorganizing 
work processes, and reducing their workforces throughout the ranks of the organization. 
Such intense change processes were often conducted under the banners of 
reengineering, lean management and downsizing. In this paper, we have used Spanish 
manufacturing data (the Survey on Business Strategies) to investigate the determinants 
of firms’ duration in downsizing.  
The analysis performed has found some important drivers of downsizing duration. In 
particular, results have offered support for the core-periphery hypothesis, in so far as 
firms with a high proportion of temporary workers are less likely to continue reducing 
the size of its permanent workforce: thus, fixed-term contracts raise the flexibility of 
firms, since varying the peripheral workforce instead of the core workforce helps to 
save employment adjustment costs (especially when the environmental context is 
characterized by economic or industry difficulties). In addition, continuation of 
downsizing is negatively associated with a recessive trend in the market, which 
                                                                                                                                                                          
specification we present, precludes the simple interpretation of the coefficients for Year1,.. Year 6. 
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confirms corporate demand as a significant explanatory factor of downsizing practices 
found in previous studies. Moreover, strong support has been offered as regards firm 
size as a stimulus for longer downsizing duration: large firms continue downsizing for 
longer than small firms.  
Our results show that, on average, downsizing spells are rather short (the median 
company in our dataset downsizes for only 1.4 years). This result is relevant, in so far as 
since the granting of regional autonomy in 1982, the Spanish Government has 
distributed massive subsidies in order to rescue companies in economic difficulties 
which have been downsizing for long. However, spending time and money in rescuing 
threatened companies in order to prevent their collapse has negative outcomes
17
. 
Therefore, the shorter downsizing spells are, the less negative outcomes will arise in this 
sense.  
In addition, we have found that downsizing duration is positively associated with the 
magnitude of employment termination costs. This result is contrary to the theoretical 
expectation, since, given that laws in Spain give workers strong employment rights 
(including the right to advance notice of layoff and the right to severance pay and other 
redundancy compensation), employers in this country are expected to shorten the spell 
of downsizing insofar as this implies incurring larger costs in labor adjustment. On the 
contrary, our findings indicate that strong employment security need not inhibit 
employers’ downsizing behavior. This result is in line with studies on the effects of 
severance costs on employment adjustment which do not support the conclusion that 
severance costs slow a firm’s decision to adjust employment levels. 
Finally, our findings indicate that the length of time a firm has downsized presents a 
negative impact on the likelihood of continuing to downsize for longer. In particular, 
from the second year of experience in downsizing, a substantial proportion of 
companies go on with the implementation of downsizing, although, from the data at 
hand, it is impossible to evaluate whether institutional or organizational learning 
concerns are behind this pattern. However, given that this result has been found not to 
be robust enough, we conclude that a replication in Spain of the pattern observed in the 
United States (where corporate persistence in downsizing is frequent) does not seem to 
be very common. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that the magnitude of the 
implemented reduction does not shorten the downsizing duration.  
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 Indeed, there has been a change of investment policy in recent years which have involved finding other 
investors in the private sector or handling failed companies over to cooperatives formed by groups of 
redundant workers (see Toharia and Ojeda, 1999). 
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Although it is beyond the scope of this study to assess whether downsizing was 
effective and sufficient to meet the companies’ current goals, our work suggests that 
Spanish companies may have learned from the U.S. experience that the organizational 
and human costs of insufficiently well-planned downsizing are high, so that carefully 
planned strategies need to be devised. On the other hand, given that downsizing 
practices are anchored in a particular legal or cultural framework and are, therefore, not 
directly applicable in another setting —particularly laws on dismissals and the 
involvement of work committees (which differ between countries) — the findings may 
reflect European laws and traditions rather than the outcome of learning through 
observation from the U.S. The legislative context in western continental Europe —
which provides workers with far greater protection from redundancies than in the U.S. 
— probably contributes to the fact that if companies need to further downsize in Spain, 
they may opt, instead, for maximizing alternatives to layoffs by redeploying employees 
to other parts of the company or changing work-time practices. These results are 
sensible insofar as repeated downsizing —which is empirically rare, as we have 
shown— may represent a significant change among Spanish companies, tending to call 
into question organizational values, norms, and processes that are usually widely 
accepted and deeply engrained. As downsizing implies (particularly in Europe) shifting 
from the basic assumption of job security to recognizing that stable employment is no 
longer guaranteed, many companies downsizing the workforce at all levels may be, 
therefore, having to re-work their understanding of their world and their role and 
relationships within the system. Apart from being costly, this is time-consuming, insofar 
as at the organizational level it essentially means that the implicit contract with its 
members needs to be redefined. 
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APPENDIX A: Procedures for employee reductions by employers in Spain 
Worker dismissals 
There are two basic ways through which any employer may adjust its workforce: (i) not 
renewing temporary contracts; and (ii) dismiss, either individually or collectively, some of its 
permanent workers.  Permanent contracts may only be terminated, under Spanish law, according 
to legally defined causes (unfair dismissals can be very expensive. Indeed, if an employer 
terminates such contract without good cause (see below) the employee will be entitled to 
receiving a severance compensation based on 45 days of salary per year of service in the 
company capped at 3 and ½ years of salary (which corresponds to more than 28 years of 
service). On the one hand, if the size of the adjustment is large enough —meaning roughly 10 
percent of the workforce— the employer has to negotiate a procedure called Expediente de 
regulacion de empleo with the workers (which includes the amount of severance pay, for which 
the law only establishes a minimum). Redundancy payments in Spain are calculated at 20 days’ 
pay per year of service, up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay. Likewise, when a collective (or 
objective) dismissal is found to be unjustified, the compensation amounts to 45 days’ pay —
except  for “promotion contracts” when the unfairly dismissed worker receives the equivalent of 
33 days’ pay. On the other hand, if the size of the required adjustment does not meet the criteria 
to be considered collective, firms may initiate an individual dismissal procedure which may take 
the form of (i) an “objective” dismissal —meaning a dismissal on the grounds of economic or 
technological circumstances; i.e., objectively justified— or (ii) a disciplinary dismissal. The 
latter are usually preferred by firms because there are fewer requirements involved (no advance 
notice is required and no initial severance payment has to be deposited; however, the employer 
faces a financial risk in case of a disciplinary dismissal to be unfair of 45 days of salary per year 
of service). In objective dismissals, if the motives for dissolving the contract are accredited, the 
severance paid to the employee should be equivalent to 20 days’ salary per year worked, up to a 
maximum of one year’s pay—otherwise, if the company can not accredit the reason for the 
termination, or breaches the formal and procedural communication requisites, it will have to opt 
to either pay the employee severance pay equivalent to 45 days’ salary per year worked, up to a 
maximum of 42 monthly payments, or to readmit the employee under the conditions in place 
prior to dismissal.  
Early retirement and voluntary severance packages  
The Law contemplates two early retirement formulae: early retirement at the age of 52 and 
reduced-rate early retirement — while others form the subject of collective bargaining. As a 
means to adjust employment, early retirement is rather widespread nowadays. It is only scarcely 
the result of a voluntary decision by the worker; instead, it is a frequent consequence of 
employment adjustment processes. Pensions are usually reduced in an extent dependent on both 
workers’ labor market experience and their distance to the statutory retirement age (65 years-
old). However, these agreements cover the possibility that in the event of crisis accords or 
“social plans” —created in order to manage and cushion the consequences of collective 
dismissals or in the case of collective contracts involving firms affected by over-manning— the 
employer may agree to pay a sum equivalent to the old age pension, until the worker reaches the 
age of 65, a system quite common in Spain (Toharia and Ojeda, 1999). Thus, these incentives 
induce elderly workers to exit the labor force before they reach the age of 65, and serve to 
protect workers who get jobless when firms implement collective dismissals. In fact, it is 
frequent for dismissed individuals in case of being above 52 years-old and after the exhaustion 
of contributory unemployment benefits, to be entitled to receiving assistance benefits up to the 
early retirement age. Apart from early retirement programmes (which are frequently offered in 
restructuring, since employers are obliged by law to offer measures designed to alleviate its 
social effects), negotiated alternatives between companies and work councils may include part-
time work programmes, transfers to other locations of the same firm and “voluntary severance 
programmes”. The use of voluntary departures as a means to cushioning redundancy is 
extremely widespread (there is no age limit established). Voluntary severance incentives are 
offered to reduce head count through self-selection. These incentives can include continuation 
of compensation for a specified period of time, a one time lump-sum payment or maintenance of 
certain benefits paid for by the company. Benefits often consist of life or health insurance, 
memberships, educational assistance and so on.  
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APPENDIX B: Main descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Censored observations (1=Yes) 0.619 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Percentage reduction in total workforce at current year 12.299 14.928 0.137 100.000 
Percentage ratio of (Employment termination costs/Total personnel costs)
b
  2.224 5.437 0.000 68.719 
Foundation year (dummy variables):  
<1960 0.186 0.390 0.000 1.000 
≥1960 & ≤1975 0.248 0.432 0.000 1.000 
>1975 & ≤1985 0.189 0.392 0.000 1.000 
>1985 0.376 0.484 0.000 1.000 
Log(Average degree of capacity utilization) 4.385 0.206 2.996 4.605 
Market in recession (1=Yes) 0.222 0.416 0.000 1.000 
Market addressed by firm is (dummy variables):     
Increasing 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000 
Constant 0.629 0.483 0.000 1.000 
Diminishing 0.154 0.361 0.000 1.000 
Log(Ratio of labor costs over sales) -2.133 1.040 -4.925 0.098 
ROS 8.379 12.687 -165.900 53.700 
ROA 12.634 18.550 -157.258 349.164 
Value Added per Employee 42.475 30.457 -35.810 327.322 
Ratio of (Temporary workers/total number of employees) 0.149 0.187 0.000 1.000 
Leverage 0.118 0.153 0.000 0.847 
Liquidity 10.515 50.644 0.000 1535.919 
Above 50 percent of capital owned by a foreign company (1=Yes) 0.337 0.473 0.000 1.000 
Above 50 percent of company’s capital is publicly owned (1=Yes) 0.486 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Type of ownership (dummy variables):     
Individual owner 0.009 0.095 0.000 1.000 
Public Limited Company 0.675 0.469 0.000 1.000 
Limited Company 0.274 0.446 0.000 1.000 
Cooperative 0.038 0.192 0.000 1.000 
Other 0.005 0.067 0.000 1.000 
Regional unemployment rate 13.664 6.341 4.710 34.240 
Firm size (expressed as total number of employees; dummy variables):     
≤ 50 0.461 0.499 0.000 1.000 
>50 & ≤ 100 0.089 0.285 0.000 1.000 
>100 & ≤ 200 0.120 0.325 0.000 1.000 
>200 & ≤ 500 0.213 0.409 0.000 1.000 
>500 0.117 0.321 0.000 1.000 
Sample size: 1,985. No. of firms: 1,188.  
a 
All variables derived from the Spanish Survey of Business Strategies and own author’s calculations, 
except for the regional unemployment rate (source: Spanish Labor Force Survey, INE). 
b 
Employment termination costs are defined as the sum of severance, early retirement and voluntary 
severance pay. 
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FIGURE 1. Sample and predicted hazard 
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TABLE 1. Life table describing the number of years in downsizing  
 
 Numbers Proportion of 
Year 
Downsizers 
at the 
beginning of 
the year 
(Risk set) 
Who stopped 
downsizing 
during the 
year 
Censored 
at the end 
of the year 
Firms at the beginning of 
the year who stopped 
downsizing during the 
year (Hazard function) 
All companies still 
downsizing at the 
end of the year 
(Survival function) 
0 1188 - - - 1.000 
1 1188 475 260 0.3998 0.600 
2 453 186 85 0.4106 0.354 
3 182 54 34 0.2967 0.249 
4 94 22 28 0.2340 0.191 
5 44 12 8 0.2727 0.139 
6 24 7 17 0.2917 0.098 
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TABLE 2.Example of Discrete Time Event History Data 
 
Case I.D. Dependent Variable: Event Ocurrence Year Time Elapsed 
1 0 1994 1 
1 0 1995 2 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
1 1 1999 6 
2 0 1997 1 
2 1 1998 2 
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TABLE 3.Maximum likelihood estimates (discrete time proportional hazard model) 
   Model 1 Model 2 
Determinants Coeff. Std. Error Signif. Coeff. Std. Error Signif. 
Duration dependence (dummy variables):       
Year 1 -1.885 1.312  -2.357 1.318 ** 
Year 2 -1.627 1.312  -2.096 1.317  
Year 3 -1.836 1.318  -2.323 1.323 * 
Year 4 -2.061 1.326  -2.514 1.333 * 
Year 5 -1.803 1.366  -2.318 1.372 * 
Year 6 -1.641 1.402  -2.147 1.406  
% Reduction in total workforce -0.006 0.004  -0.007 0.004  
% Ratio of (Employment termination 
costs/Total personnel costs) -0.034 0.020 * -0.036 0.020 * 
(% ratio of Employment termination 
costs/Total personnel costs)
2
 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  
Foundation year (dummy variables):       
<1960 - - - - - - 
≥1960 & ≤1975 0.256 0.171  0.257 0.170  
>1975 & ≤1985 0.340 0.187 * 0.375 0.187 ** 
>1985 0.031 0.176  0.019 0.176  
Log(Average degree of capacity utilization) 0.033 0.267  0.103 0.265  
Market in recession (1=Yes) -0.349 0.149 ** -0.350 0.149 ** 
Market addressed by firm is (dummy 
variables):    
   
Increasing - - - - - - 
Constant -0.158 0.128  -0.171 0.127  
Diminishing -0.065 0.195  -0.051 0.194  
Log(Ratio of labor costs over sales) -0.016 0.071  -0.015 0.071  
ROS 0.027 0.006 *** - - - 
ROA - - - 0.015 0.004 *** 
Value Added per Employee 0.002 0.002  0.005 0.002 ** 
Ratio of (Temporary workers/total number of 
employees) 2.144 0.335 *** 2.195 0.334 *** 
Liquidity 0.078 0.354  0.103 0.351  
Current ratio -0.003 0.002  -0.002 0.002  
Above 50 percent of capital owned by a 
foreign company (1=Yes) 0.111 0.125  0.108 0.125  
Above 50 percent of company’s capital is 
publicly owned -0.500 0.107 *** -0.499 0.107 *** 
Type of ownership (dummy variables):       
Individual owner - - - - - - 
Public Limited Company 0.952 0.576 * 1.053 0.605 * 
Limited Company 1.136 0.580 ** 1.255 0.608 ** 
Cooperative 0.947 0.629  1.043 0.654  
Other 1.029 0.933  1.108 0.952  
Regional unemployment rate 0.031 0.011 *** 0.030 0.011 *** 
Firm size (dummy variables):       
≤ 50 - - - - - - 
>50 & ≤ 100 -0.549 0.194 *** -0.507 0.194 *** 
>100 & ≤ 200 -0.760 0.188 *** -0.739 0.188 *** 
>200 & ≤ 500 -0.886 0.165 *** -0.873 0.166 *** 
>500 -1.182 0.219 *** -1.147 0.220 *** 
 Log-Likelihood -1149.8262 -1153.5147 
Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Estimations also include controls for industries. Sample 
size=1,985 observations. 
 
